by M. Ulric Killion
The launch of Omid satellite from Semnan province of Iran; Photo/Wikipedia.
On February 3, 2009, to the consternation of a Western world, as Reuters reported, “Iran said it had launched a domestically made satellite into orbit for the first time on Tuesday, prompting further concern among Western powers and in Israel over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran said the launch of the Omid (Hope) research and telecom satellite was a major step in its space technology timed to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution that ousted the U.S.-backed shah.” Iran’s first satellite launching coincided with celebrations of the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, while, more importantly, raising concerns in the United States and other countries about Iran’s potential use of long-range missiles to send nuclear warheads halfway around the globe (Fathi and Broad, 2009).
The threat of Iran being capable of sending a nuclear warhead halfway around the globe, however, is more of an exaggeration, rather than reality, of its nuclear potentiality. Intelligence sources from Western countries cannot even agree on an estimation of when Iran will actually be able to produce nuclear weapons. This is because of earlier estimates widely ranging from 1 to 3 years (French/Israeli estimates), to 5 years (US pentagon estimate), to 10 years (CIA estimate) (Killion, 2007).
Weapons experts also generally agree that the act was a symbolic one because of the size of the satellite. Launching a heavy warhead intercontinental distances, according to aerospace experts, would require a far more powerful satellite. The launch was not a moment for panic, as Charles D. Ferguson, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) explained, because, “It shouldn’t force us to make a missile defense decision in Europe” (Fathi and Broad, 2009). Nonetheless, as reported by the New York Times (Fathi and Broad, 2009), Iran’s launch came as a time when, “President Obama has struck a conciliatory tone toward Tehran, suggesting that he will move toward dialogue after years of tensions. Even so, he may take a tough line in the coming months and could seek to tighten sanctions against Iran.”
The concern with Iran and its nuclear program is part of a larger issue, which is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, though Iran routinely appears in the media as the only culprit desiring to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. The problem with so characterizing this larger, more important issue, in the context of Iran alone, is a failure to recognize that Israel also has a nuclear program. Borrowing from the jurist’s tool, if the issue sub judice is the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Iran in the Middle East, then a critical sub issue might also be the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Israel in the Middle East, thus, presenting the issues of Iran and nuclear weapons, and Israel and nuclear weapons.
IRAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the media in general, there is a great deal of debate concerning Iran and its growing potential to develop nuclear weapons, though Iran rightly maintains that it has the right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Borrowing from the title of a recent Washington Post (Erdbrink and Branign, 2009) article, “In Iran, nuclear issue is also a medical one.” This is because, “In Iran, an estimated 850,000 kidney, heart and cancer patients are facing a race against time. Although these patients are in need of post-surgery treatment with nuclear medicine, doctors and nuclear scientists here say domestic production will dry up when a research reactor in Tehran runs out of fuel, perhaps as soon as this spring” (Erdbrink and Branign, 2009). A problem is that the suspicions of Western countries may be so strong that they threaten the availability of nuclear medicine.
For instance, as earlier reported by the Los Angeles Times (November 2, 2009), Iran wanted “to send 800 kilograms, or 1,764 pounds, of its enriched uranium abroad to be exchanged for fuel for a medical reactor,” though many in the West deemed this a ploy or compromise to a pending United Nations-backed proposal. As reported by the Los Angeles Times, “The original proposal, backed by the Obama administration, had called for Iran to send abroad 1,200 kilograms, or 70 percent of its nuclear material supply, by year's end, temporarily lowering Iran's capacity to build a nuclear bomb and creating the diplomatic breathing room for a possible broader deal.”
As for the year-end deadline of the Obama administration, Washington policy may be evidencing a policy shift toward Iran as oppose to harsh sanctions. The Washington Post reports (2009),
Ten months after President Obama set a year-end deadline for Iran to engage with world powers on its nuclear program, the government in Tehran has failed to respond in kind, other than an abortive gesture in the fall. Now, in what may be a difficult balancing act, officials say the administration wants to carefully target sanctions to avoid alienating the Iranian public -- while keeping the door ajar to a resolution of the struggle over Iran's nuclear program. The aim of any sanctions is to force the Tehran government to the negotiating table, rather than to punish it for either its apparent push to develop a nuclear weapon or its treatment of its people.
As such, it seems as though the world may have been witnessing a new era in US-Iran relations. This is because the Obama administration may employ a new strategic approach to Iran and nuclear proliferation in Middle East by an approach characterizing targeted-sanctions rather than harsh sanctions (Washington Post, 2009). No doubt, in the halls of the U.S. Congress, conservative members of congress are sounding an alarm, while the more liberal members may be feeling a mild distraction.
A problem is that many lack an understanding of the workings of the International Atom Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is the international center of cooperation in the nuclear field, which was originally set up in 1957 as the “Atoms for Peace” organization and housed within the United Nations family. For fulfilling its international role, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) establishes a safeguards system that is under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the NPT in transferring technology for peaceful purposes. The primary pillars of the NPT are non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to peacefully, use nuclear technology (Killion, 2007). Both the IAEA and the treaty designedly address the problems of nuclear deterrence and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while allowing for the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
In his article Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation (2004), Jeffery Record writes, “During the Cold War, the principal function of nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence was not considered a tool of nonproliferation. The primary mechanisms for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons were the nonproliferation regime established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the U.S. extension of nuclear deterrence to states that might otherwise have sought security through the acquisition of nuclear weapons.” In other words, the IAEA and the NPT intend to address the issue or problem of nuclear deterrence theory and its attendant problematic proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Then there is the issue of Iran and the NPT. On the issue of using nuclear technology, though many will disagree, misunderstand or misinterpret, Iran, as a signatory state of the NPT, can rightfully contend that it can resume uranium enrichment program for a civilian nuclear energy program, thus rightly claim the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy based on the NPT, at Article III, Paragraph 3, and Article IV. The full text of Articles III reads:
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
The full text of the NPT, at Article IV, reads:
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in. the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
The recognition of Iran’s rights under the treaty (i.e., NPT, Arts. III & IV), however, does not condone an earlier development in the level of enriched uranium that is allegedly in its possession, which is higher than the low-enriched material used to generate power, and heading toward a weapons-grade level (Killion, 2007; Hafezi, 2009). This is a different issue in terms of Iran and the terms of the NPT, because a weapons-grade level constitutes a blatant breach of the treaty.
Then on February 7, 2010, there is also the problem of Iran’s announcement, “that it will start enriching uranium to higher levels, shrugging off international fears that such a move will bring it closer to being able to make nuclear warheads. . . . The Iranian move came just days after Ahmadinejad appeared to move close to endorsing the original deal, which foresaw Tehran exporting the bulk of its low-enriched uranium to Russia for further enrichment and then conversion for fuel rods for the research reactor. The plan was endorsed by the U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany - the six powers that originally elicited a tentative approval from Iran in landmark talks last fall” (George Jahn, Iran says it will increase uranium enrichment, Washington Post, Feb. 9, 2010).
The problem of Iran commencing to enrich uranium alarms the world for obvious reasons. This is because, “Although material for the fissile core of a nuclear warhead must be enriched to a level of 90 percent or more, just getting its stockpile to the 20 percent mark would be a major step for the country’s nuclear program. While enriching to 20 percent would take about one year, using up to 2,000 centrifuges at Tehran’s underground Natanz facility, any next step - moving from 20 to 90 percent - would take only half a year and between 500-1,000 centrifuges. Achieving the 20-percent level ‘would be going most of the rest of the way to weapon-grade uranium.’” (Jahn, 2010).
EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
On January 28, 2010, the US Senate passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (S. 2799) (International Trade Law News, Jan. 28, 2010). The Act (S. 2799), notwithstanding possible economic sanctions by the UN body, intends to forestall Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons or, perhaps more broadly stated, a greater proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This is because Israel implicitly through the secrecy (i.e., policy of opacity) of its nuclear weapons programs has comfortably nestled itself in the category of a non-signatory state, pursuant to the NPT, alongside India. Nuclear weapons are already a geopolitical reality in the Middle East. This also presents a problem for nuclear deterrence theory.
This is because if Israel has already developed and now possesses nuclear weapons, then Israel is the first country to actually, introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. For this reason, assuming arguendo, Iran is developing a level of enrich uranium that is approaching a weapons-grade level, then Iran may have launched its nuclear weapons program in direct response to Israel’s existing nuclear weapons arsenal, or simply, as a nuclear deterrent or pursuant to nuclear deterrence theory (Record, 2004; explaining that nuclear deterrence is not a tool of nonproliferation). In such a scenario, Iran and its nuclear weapons program, in conjunction with Israel’s nuclear weapons arsenal, may, ultimately, be equally blameworthy for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
Additionally, this does not excuse Iran from the allegations or charge of developing nuclear weapons; it is just that reason dictates that both Iran and Israel may now equally share the blame for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Moreover, the problem remains how to forestall Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, which is a direct violation of the NPT. In answer to this problem, key power states or western states are focusing, at least for now, on economic sanctions rather than military force.
This presents the issue of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in its February 8, 2010-Daily Briefly presented a succinct analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions against Iran. The analysis at CFR.org Daily Brief, Feb. 8, 2010, at relevant part, reads:
On Forbes.com, Jamsheed Choksy says economic sanctions against Iran have not curbed its oppression, nuclear ambitions, or support for terrorism, because they have failed to target "the lavish lifestyles of those in power." The Washington Institute’s Jeffrey White and Loring White say war games conducted by Harvard University, Tel Aviv University, and the Brookings Institution suggest the West is unlikely to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. In the Financial Times, Philip Stephens says the United States and Europe should more aggressively support democracy and human rights in Iran, but recognize that overt foreign backing for the opposition movement would only hurt it.
The analysis, though brief, succinctly states that the failure of economic sanctions in the past, in conjunction with the war games, prognosticate that economic sanctions will be ineffective against Iran’s regime. The observation by Choksy (Forbes.com) is critical, notwithstanding the result of the war games conducted by Harvard University. Choksy distinguishably observed that the economic sanctions fail to target “the lavish lifestyles of those in power.”
Chosky’s observation deserves further mention. This is because the effective head of Iran’s political establishment is not the president or the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but rather the Iranian Supreme Leader or the religious leader selected by an Assembly of Experts (Killion, 2007). The problem is the wealth of clerics in power or what Choksy characterizes as “the lavish lifestyles of those in power,” which economic sanctions fail to target.
A Brief Report on Bank Accounts of the Heads of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Foreign Countries:
(With special thanks to one of the Green supporters who is working in one of Malaysia’s Banks)
1- Gholam Hossein Elham: 25 M USD at Dubai, 13 M USD at Turkey, 17 M USD at Swiss, 0.7 M USD at Beirut
2- S.H. Panahian: 11 M USD at Islamic Bank of Sharjeh, 4 M EU at Malaysia,
3- Masoud Kazemi: 45 M EU Germany, 4.2 M USD at Dubai
4- Ali Hashemi Bahramani: 5.2 M USD at Kuwait, 11 M EU at Belgium, 23 M USD at Dubai, an Unknown account in Swiss
5- Mohamad Mohamadi: 12 M USD at Dubai, 17 M USD at Kuwait, 8 M EU at Turkey
6- Mehdi Ahmadi Nejad: 18 M EU at Belgium, 45 M EU at Swiss, 44 M USD at Islamic bank at Sharjeh
7- Naziyeh Khamenehiee: 7 M USD at Turkey, 65 M EU at Germany, 122 Pound M at Great Britain
8- Sadegh Mahsouli: 14 M EU at United Arab Emirates, 24 M USD at Turkey, 3 M EU at Malaysia
9- Mojtaba Khameneiee: 1 B Pound Great Britain (has been blocked), 2.2 B EU at Germany, 766 M USD at Qatar, an unknown account at Swiss
10- Hossein Ma`adi khah: 15 M USD at Kuwait, 45 M EU at Austria, 7 M USD at United Arab Emirates
11- Isa KAlantari: 3.2 M EU at Belgium, 1.2 M USD at Italy
12- Hossein Taeb: 122 M USD United Arab Emirates, 42 M EU Italy
13- Masoud Hajarian Kashani: 92 M USD at Austria, 13.7 M USD Qatar [CUTOFF]
14- Sardar Ahmad Vahidi: 32 M USD United Arab Emirates, 65 M USD at Turkey, 122 M USD at Germany (has been blocked)
15- Abas Kadkhodaiee: 2.5 M EU Itay, 7.1 M USD Kuwait, 32 M USD Dubai
16- Mojtaba Mesbaah Yazdi: 184 M USD Dubai, 221 M USD at Alnakhl Corporation, 55 M EU at Spain
17- Ali Mesbaah Yazdi, 45 M USD United Arab Emirates, 17 M USD Turkey, 65 M Pound at Barkley Bank at Britain, 75 M USD at South Africa, 110 M EU at Germany
18- Hessin Firouz Abadi: 320 M USD at Malaysia, 65 MUSD United Arab Emirates, 103 M USD Kuwait, 17 M USD at Turkey, Unknown bank account at Swiss
19- Parviz Fatah: 16 M USD Turkey, 5.2 M EU at Turkey, 22 USD Swiss
20- Hassan Shajooni: 66.5 M USD Dubai, 39 m USD Kuwait, 11.2 M USD Beirout, 8 M USD Malaysia
21- H Asgar Oladi: 172 M USD Belgium, 120 M EU Germany, 420 MUSD Alnakhl Company, 42 MUSD turkey, 219 MUSD Malaysia, Unknown bank account at Swiss
22- Hossein Jannati: 288 MUSD dubai, an Unknown amount at a bank in Turkey which has been guaranteed for 200 M USD, 150 M USD at Japan, 32 MUSD at Malaysia
23- Sakineh Khamenehie: 25 M USD at Malaysia, 14 M USD Qatar, 112 M USD at Dubai
24- Esfandyar Rahim Mashaiee: 5.2 M EU Germany, 32 M EU Italy, 41 M USD Dubai
25- H Mohamadi Araghi: 48.4 M USD Dubai, 2.4 M USD Beirut, 56 M EU Spain
26- Ali Akbar Velayati: 244 M EU Germany, 6 M EU Austria, 56 MUSD Malaysia
27- Mohamad Mohamadi Reyshahri: 241 M USD Alnakhl Company, 121 M USD Dubai, 48 M USD Germany, 43 M EU Italy
28- Mohsen Hashemi bahramani: 35 MUSD United Arab Emirates, 65 M EU Belgium
29- Masoomeh Hashemi Samareh: 11 MUSD Qatar, 5.9 M USD Malaysia
30- Ali Larijani: 185 M EU Austria, 16 M USD United Arab Emirates, 112 M EU Malaysia
31- Abas Akhondi: 9 M USD United Arab Emirates, 5.2 M USD Beirout Bank
32- Mohsen Rafighdoust: 129 M USD Belgium, 44 M USD Kuwait, 92 M USD Malaysia
33- Hamid Hosseini: 30 M USD Malaysia, 82 M EU Spain,
34- Mohamad Hosseini: 14 M USD United Arab Emirates, 7 M USD Kuwait, 3 M USD Turkey, 11 M Pound Britain
35- Mahmoud Hosseini: 3.2 M USD Turkey, 11.4 M USD Kuwait
36- Mojtaba Hashemi samareh: 28 M EU Spain, 76 M USD United Arab Emirates, 124 M USD Malaysia
37- Kamran Daneshjou: 76 M EU Austria, 7.2 M USD Malaysia
38- Ahmad reza Radan: 98 M USD United Arab Emirates, 65 USD Kuwait, 121 M USD South Africa
39- Yadollah Javani: 22 M USD United Arab Emirates, 5 M USD India, 23 M EU Portugal
40- Gholam Reza Fayaz: 65 M USD Malaysia, 40.9 M USD Kuwait
41- AliReza Fayaz: 23 M USD United Arab Emirates, 17 M EU Turkey, 7 M EU Italy
42- Ali Mobasheri, 12elgium, 19 M USD Malaysia, 42 M USD Kuwait
43- Mohamad Naghdi: 142 M EU United Arab Emirates, 24 M USD United Arab Emirates, 66 M USD Malaysia
44- Farhad Daneshjou: 2.3 M USD United Arab Emirates, 5.6 M USD Turkey
45- Khosro Daneshjou: 11 MUSD Turkey, 7 M USD Zcheck Republic
46- Hamid Hosseini: 4.2 M USD Malaysia, 28 M USD United Arab Emirates
47- Mohamad Bagher Kharazi: 120 M USD Lebanon, 86 M USD United Arab Emirates, 42 M USD at Barkley Bank South Africa Branch
48- Mehdi Hashemi Samareh: 5.7 M USD Turkey, 44 M USD Kuwait
49- Hamid Rasay: 62 MUSD Hungry, 32 M EU Germany, 18 M Pound Britain, 14 M USD United Arab Emirates
50- Hossein mousavi Ardebili: 21 MUSD Kuwait, 110 M USD United Arab Emirates, 32 M USD Malaysia
51- Ali Mobasheri: 7 M Eu Austria, 22.4M USD United Arab Emirates
52- Hossein Shariat Madari: 225 M USD United Arab Emirates, 54 M USD Alnakhl Company, 65 M EU HSBS Bank Britain, 156 M USD Malaysia, 600 M USD St. Peterzburg Bank, Russia,
53- Hossein Shahmoradi: 56 M USD United Arab Emirates, 64 M USD Malaysia, 7 M USD India
54- Kamran Daneshjou: 24 M USD Japan, 43 M USD Malaysia
55- Davoud Ahmadi Nezhad: 55 M USD United Arab Emirates, 48 M EU United Arab Emirates, 8 M USD St. Peterzburg Bank, Russia,
56- Abdollah Araghi: 84 m USD United Arab Emirates, 127 M USD Lebanon, 76 M USD Malaysia, SecretAccount at Swiss
57- Baha-odin Hosseini Hashemi: 45 M USD United Arab Emirates, 80 M USD Malaysia
58- Mohi Odin Fazel Harandi: 52 M USD Omman, 45 M USD Saudi Arabia
59- Ahmad Jannati: 450 M Eu Belgium, 143 M USD Alnakhl Company, 124 MUSD United Arab Emirates, 267 M USD Malaysia, 118 M USD South Africa, Unknown Bank account at swiss
60- Ali Janati: 35 M USD United Arab Emirates, 155 M USD Turkey, 55 M EU Germany, Unknown Bank account at swiss
61- Hossein Safar Harandi: 38 M USD United Arab Emirates, 20 M USD Malaysia, An unknown account in Turkey
62- Morteza Rafighdoust: 120 M EU Germany, Unknown Bank account at swiss
63- M H Parsa: 43 M USD Turkey, 12 M USD Malaysia
64- Fatemeh Asgar Oladi: 43 M USD Qatar, 16 M USD Turkey
65- Ali Akbar Mohtashemi: 125 M USD Sharjeh, 85 M USD Kuwait, 200 M USD Malaysia, Unknown Bank account at swiss
66- Yaser Bahramani Hashemi: 22 M EU Germany, 12 M EU Austria, 14 M USD United Arab Emirates
67- Gholam Ali Haddad Adel : 12 M USD Turkey, 2.4 M USD Malaysia, 43 M USD United Arab Emirates
CONCLUSION
For all of these reasons, the analysis, though brief, of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is on point. Assuming the accuracy of the information on the bank accounts of clerics, the article titled, Iranian Mullahs and Others with Bank Accounts in Foreign Countries, actually substantiates Choksy’s (Forbes.com) contention of a critical failure of economic sanctions to target the wealth of clerics in power or what he characterizes as “the lavish lifestyles of those in power.” As for the war games, they simply do not directly address the issue of the effectiveness of economic sanctions.
As for Philip Stephens’s (Financial Times) idea of western powers focusing, though indirectly, on the promotion of democracy and human rights in Iran, there remains the problem of a radical cleric. As even Iran’s new president Ahmadinejad, unlike both of his predecessors Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (president, 1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (president, 1997-2005), who is not a cleric rather a military man (Killion, 2007), as Ilan Berman (Understanding Ahmadinejad, 2006) earlier explained, “Since taking office in August 2005, however, the 50-year-old Ahmadinejad has done much to demonstrate his radical credentials. He has ratcheted up the Islamic Republic’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and the United States. His government has systematically rolled back domestic freedoms and deepened its control over Iranian society. And, under his direction, the Islamic Republic has accelerated its very public march toward an atomic capability.”
Additionally, the idea of promoting, though indirectly, democracy and human rights in Iran also fails to directly address the issue of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. All of this prognosticates that Iran will eventually acquire nuclear weapons, if not simply withdraw from the NPT, notwithstanding western powers actually concentrating their efforts on economic sanctions that ultimately target the wealth of clerics in power or “the lavish lifestyles of those in power.”
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2010.
Chinese President Hu Jintao (R Front) meets with tunnel construction workers in Xiamen, southeast China’s Fujian Province, during his inspection tour in Xiamen from Feb. 14 to 15, the first two days in China's Lunar New Year. (Photo: Xinhua/Ju Peng). 
(An abandoned bunker on a Gulangyu beach, in Xiamen, which shows obvious structural damage on the outside wall; Photo by M. Ulric Killion).
