Saturday, May 30, 2009

Pyongyang and Regional Peace in Korean Peninsula

As concerns Pyongyang's new missle diplomacy, Zhang Haizhou (China Daily, 2009) wrote, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) test-fired two more short-range missiles yesterday, ignoring international condemnation of its nuclear test on Monday and accusing the US of plotting against its government. The DPRK had test-fired three short-range missiles on Monday hours after conducting a nuclear test, drawing strong reactions from China and the rest of the world. Yesterday, too, China "firmly opposed" the DPRK's action, but asked the international community to remain calm in formulating a response. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said China is "resolutely opposed" to the nuclear test, and it urges the DPRK to return to the talkJustify Fulls. But any action taken by the UN Security Council should help resolve the issue peacefully, he said."
Further Zhang wrote, "The DPRK test-fired the two 13-km range missiles — one ground-to-air, the other ground-to-sea — from its east coast, the Republic of Korea's (ROK) Yonhap news agency said, citing an unnamed government official. Yonhap said the DPRK was preparing to launch a third missile from its west coast, again citing an unnamed official." All of this indicates that Pyongyang appears committed to acting contrary to the international community and international goals of eventually eliminating threat to regional peace in the Korean peninsula and stemming the international growth of nuclear weaponry.

China's Xinhua daily reported that, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced Wednesday that it will no longer stand by the ceasefire agreement ending the 1950-53 Korean War, in response to South Korea's participation to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The DPRK's military said in a statement that it no longer considers itself bound by the armistice that ended the Korean War, a move seen as a strong protest over the South Korea's participation of the US-led program. The DPRK took South Korea's total participation to the US program as "a declaration of war," said the DPRK delegation in Panmunjom in a statement, the official KCNA news agency said. The statement said the DPRK would not guarantee the security of US and South Korean warships and civil ships in the west sea of the DPRK (Xinhua, 2009). . .

In early April of 2009, China called for calm when Pyongyang vowed to restart its nuclear reactor and boycott the Six-Party Talks for good in retaliation for the UN Security Council's condemnation of its rocket launch. "We hope the relevant parties proceed from the overall interest, and exercise calm and restraint to safeguard the process of the Six-Party Talks," Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu told a press conference. . . (China Daily/Xinhua/Agencies, 2009).

The DPRK's swift denunciation of the council's "hostile" move came hours after all 15 members unanimously agreed to condemn the April 5 launch as a violation of UN resolutions and to tighten sanctions against the country. The UN statement, issued eight days after the launch, was weaker than the resolution Japan and the United States had pursued but still drew an angry response from Pyongyang, which called it "unjust" and a violation of international law. The DPRK said it sent a communications satellite into space as part of a peaceful bid to develop its space program; but the US and others call the launch an illicit test of the technology used to fire an intercontinental ballistic missile (China Daily/Xinhua/Agencies, 2009).

The present actions by Pyongyang only substantiate the pessimism of many experts concerning the future of nuclear talks. New approaches and strategies may be needed for addressing the issue of regional peace in the Korean peninsula, including how to stem the international growth of nuclear weaponry.

As one source earlier observed in April, Chinese analysts said yesterday that the chances of the Six-Party Talks resuming soon are slim, and the denuclearization process on the Korean Peninsula will remain in limbo now that Pyongyang has withdrawn from the disarmament talks. "There may be no such thing as the 'next step' for the disarmament talks," said Professor Piao Jianyi, chief of the Center of Korean Peninsula Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). He suggested that Washington come up with new strategies in dealing with the DPRK. "The Obama administration needs new ideas," he said, adding that Pyongyang may reactivate its nuclear facilities in three to six months. . . (China Daily/Xinhua/Agencies, 2009).


DPRK declares to tear up truce agreement, Xinhua, May 27, 2009.

Zhang Haizhou, Pyongyang defiant, tests 2 more missiles, China Daily, May 27, 2009.

DPRK to restart nuclear reactor, China Daily/Xinhua/Agencies, April 15, 2009.

Thursday, May 28, 2009

The China Manipulates Currency Allegation: Failings of a Political Argument

by M. Ulric Killion

For various reasons, China’s pegged yuan (RMB - China currency: Renminbi) controversy is considered a violation of WTO standards that can be brought before the WTO's DSB, rather than the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The WTO criterion for an actionable subsidy is a finding of a requisite contribution that benefits a specific Chinese industry. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Articles 1-9, or the WTO SCM Agreement, at Article 2.1, provides that a subsidy must be “specific to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (i.e., referred to in this Agreement as ‘certain enterprises’).

A requisite contribution normally consists of some form of payment or price support for the industry. Article 1.1 of the WTO SCM Agreement deems a subsidy to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as ‘government’), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments;
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994; and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred. (WTO SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)).
The difficulty in fulfilling this requirement is to be able to link the pegging of the yuan to a direct benefit to the industry in the form of payments and price supports. According to the WTO SCM, Articles 1.1(a) and 2(b), the key language is: “[A] benefit is thereby conferred.” “Asserting that a lack of a currency exchange market in China in which the value of the yuan is determined by supply and demand,” as Benitah earlier explained, “attenuates arguments that the yuan is manipulated for the benefit of a specific industry.” 
Additionally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through its Articles of Agreement at Article IV, has primary jurisdiction over foreign exchange rate policies, and prohibits unfair advantage by currency manipulation. More particularly, the Articles of Agreement of the international monetary fund or the IMF Agreement, at Article IV sec. 3(a), provides that “The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations under Section 1 of this Article.”

While a challenge could be mounted against China based upon Article XV, paragraph 4, of the GATT 1994, which bars participating members from using "exchange rate action" to frustrate the intent of the WTO Agreement, as long as China's exchange rate policy is in conformity with the IMF Agreement such as Article IV sec. 3(a), such a dispute will not be subject to jurisdiction of the WTO DSB. In particular, GATT 1947, at Art. XV, provides, “Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.” 

The IMF agreement, at XXIX. Interpretation, (a), also provides, “Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision. If the question particularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an Executive Director, it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with Article XII, Section 3(j).” Under such circumstances, the DSB is precluded from determining whether the yuan is being manipulated or being grossly overvalued.

For these reasons, the pegged yuan is therefore currently not considered to be in violation of the IMF Agreement and GATT. The IMF Agreement, at Article. IV sec. 2(b)-(c), also reads: “To accord with the development of the international monetary system, the Fund, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, may make provision for general exchange arrangements without limiting the right of members to have exchange arrangements of their choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and the obligations under Section 1 of this Article.”

Rather, China's currency regime is considered to be prima facie in compliance with the IMF agreement. Therefore, China, pursuant to IMF agreement, Article IV sec. 2 (b)-(c), may maintain its currency exchange regime as it deems appropriate. China, however, is not precluded from being brought before the IMF and GATT for manipulating its currency for purposes of unfair competition. 

The problem of proving such manipulation is the IMF's lack of dispute settlement procedure and the prerequisite of IMF action before issues of currency exchange can be brought before the DSB. Article XXIX of the IMF Agreement, as Denters earlier explained, “is not intended to settle disputes between members as a WTO dispute settlement panel might resolve a trade dispute.”  

The earlier findings of the Senate in the Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 (US S. 1592, 108th Cong. 2, 2003) at sections 2 (18) and (19) on the other hand, do offer a basis upon which action can be taken against China. According to the Fair Currency Enforcement Act, assuming it has not been subject to amendment, manipulations of currency by under-valuation are actionable subsidies and countervailing measures distorting fair competition. 

The Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 requires negotiation and appropriate action with respect to certain countries that engage in currency manipulation and the relevant portions read as follows:
(18) Deliberate currency manipulation by nations to significantly undervalue their currencies also may be interpreted as a violation of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (as described in section 101(d)(12)) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which could lead to action and remedy under the World Trade Organization dispute settlement procedures.
(19) Deliberate, large-scale intervention by governments in currency markets to significantly undervalue their currencies may be a nullification and impairment of trade benefits precluded under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and subject to remedy.
In addition, the Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003 at Sections 2 (16) and (17) also incorporates Article IV of the IMF agreement.
(16) Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund prohibits currency manipulation by a member for the purposes of gaining an unfair competitive advantage over other members, and the related surveillance provision defines "manipulation' to include ‘protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market.’
(17) Under Article XV of the Exchange Agreements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, all contracting parties "shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor by trade action, the intent of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.' Such actions are actionable violations. The intent of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Exchange Agreement, as stated in the preamble of that Agreement, includes the objective of ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and currency manipulation may constitute a trade barrier disruptive to reciprocal and mutually advantageous trade arrangements.’
International Monetary and Financial Committee

Section 2 (16) of the Fair Currency Enforcement Act, however, more broadly defines the prohibited acts of the IMF Articles of Agreement as “protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market.” This is because IMF Agreement Article. VIII sec. 3, reads:
No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to in Article V, Section 1 to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices, whether within or outside margins under Article IV or prescribed by or under Schedule C, except as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the Fund. If such arrangements and practices are engaged in at the date when this Agreement enters into force, the member concerned shall consult with the Fund as to their progressive removal unless they are maintained or imposed under Article XIV, Section 2, in which case the provisions of Section 3 of that Article shall apply.
The exchange rate frustrating the intent of the IMF and GATT is also addressed in section 2(17) of the Fair Currency Enforcement Act as “exchange action,” and not as “exchange rate action,” as it appears in the applicable rules of the IMF and GATT.

The shortcoming of the Fair Currency Enforcement Act, as DeRosa earlier observed, is that it has been inconsistent with previous Treasury Department inquiries into China's foreign exchange rate regime. The Treasury Department, as required by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (22 U.S.C. 5304-5305, 1988), has annually analyzed the exchange rate policies of China including China's pegged yuan, which has been a problem since 1994. 

Under this Act, the Treasury Department seeks to determine whether China manipulates the currency exchange rate between the yuan and the dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments, or for gaining an unfair competitive advantage in international trade. In Treasury Department reports (Rep. to Congress on Int'l Econ. Exch. Rate Policies) to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate policies, Treasury Secretary Snow routinely reported that while China has pegged its currency since 1994 at 8.28 to the dollar, this practice does not meet the criteria in the Trade Act to warrant formal sanctions.

Source: Killion, M. Ulric. 2004. China’s Foreign Currency Regime: The Kagan Thesis and Legalification of the WTO Agreement, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 43 (Winter).

Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2009.

Friday, May 15, 2009

Zhao Yiyang posthumously debates Tiananmen controversy

 by M. Ulric Killion 

The Chinese edition of Zhao Ziyang’s memoir, “Prisoner of the State,” in a book shop in Hong Kong, May 2009; Photo/European Pressphoto Agency.

John Pomfret (Washington Post Staff Writer) writes, "Zhao Ziyang violated one of the central tenets of Communist Party doctrine: He spoke out. But it is only now, four years after his death, that the world is hearing what he had to say. In a long-secret memoir to be published in English and Chinese next week, just in time for the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the former head of the Chinese Communist Party claims that the decision to impose martial law around Beijing in May 1989 was illegal and that the party's leaders could easily have negotiated a peaceful solution to the unrest."

"The posthumous appearance of Zhao's memoir, which he dictated onto audiotapes and the publisher has titled 'Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang,'" as John Pomfret explains, "marks the first time since the establishment of the People's Republic of China 60 years ago that a senior Chinese leader has spoken out so directly against the party and its system. Reaching from the grave, Zhao pillories a conservative wing of the party for missteps that led to the bloody crackdown, which began after dark on June 3, 1989, and left hundreds dead. Few in China's leadership at the time escape Zhao's criticism. He castigates Deng Xiaoping, the man credited with opening China to the West and launching its economic reforms; Li Peng, the dour premier at the time of the Tiananmen tragedy; Deng Liqun, a hard-line party theoretician; Li Xiannian, a former president; and even Hu Yaobang, Zhao's longtime ally, whose death on April 15, 1989, touched off the student-led protests" (Pomfret, 2009).

(Chinese translation by Washington Post).

According to Pomfret, "But Zhao's memoir also constitutes a broader challenge to the generally accepted version of history, especially in China, that places Deng at the center of the economic reforms that have turned China into a global economic power. While acknowledging that none of the reforms "would have been possible without Deng Xiaoping's support," Zhao depicts Deng as more of a benevolent godfather than a hands-on architect. Much of the critical design -- such as dismantling agricultural communes, mapping out China's hugely successful export-led growth model and conjuring up ideological sleights-of-hand that allowed China's Communists to embrace capitalism -- was left to Zhao. In China, Zhao's role in the momentous economic changes and political events that led up to the Tiananmen crackdown have been airbrushed from history. "Prisoner of the State" is his attempt to place himself back in the picture. "

(Chinese translation by Washington Post).

Moreover, Pomfret observed, though certain to stir a controversy, "Reading Zhao's unadorned and unboastful account of his stewardship, it becomes apparent that it was he rather than Deng who was the actual architect of reform, wrote Roderick MacFarquhar, a professor of Chinese history at Harvard University, in a foreword to the book. . . ."

On January 12, 1989, Hu Jintao, appointed Party Secretary in the Tibet Autonomous region (Tibet), arrived in Lhasa, Tibet (Killion, 2006). However, soon after his arrival, Hu would have to deal with ongoing peaceful demonstrations in Lhasa that turned violent, with local police shooting into the crowd. During this period, then General Secretary Zhao Ziyang had urged Hu, before leaving for Tibet, to avoid frictions exacerbated by Chinese soldiers. Hu Jintao's first challenge followed the announcement of the death of the revered Panchen Lama. The pending crisis was whether Beijing would cooperate with the exiled Dalai Lama in choosing a successor (Killion, 2006).

As demonstrations and protests ensued in Lhasa, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang advised Hu to "overcome the hard with the soft." On February 20, 1989, just months preceding the Tiananmen Square tragedy, Hu Jintao ordered 1,700 armed-police (People's Liberation Army) (PLA) to parade in formation through the streets of Lhasa in a show of force. Nonetheless, on March 5, 1989, there was a demonstration that was later termed a "riot" by the CCP. During this peaceful demonstration, which was a non-violent pro-democracy demonstration, armed-police opened fire on civilian demonstrators, killing ten civilians, with one policeman dying. In the ensuing days, police killed 40 more Tibetans. These pro-democracy demonstrations, although crushed by the military, were demonstrations in favor of Tibetan independence (Roberts, 1999).

At the onset of crisis, Hu Jintao had earlier coordinated plans with the Chengdu Military Region Command to move about seventeen divisions, or about 17,000 PLA soldiers into Lhasa. On March 7, 1989, then Premier Li Peng declared martial law. The large PLA presence in Tibet kept the region quiet through the rest of the spring and summer of 1989, including through the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, which was also a violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations that the CCP also termed a riot (Killion, 2006). This leaves many anxious to read Zhao Ziyang's supposed notes regarding the details of what, actually, occurred during the historical events of the Tiananmen controversy.


John Pomfret, China's Zhao Details Tiananmen Debate, Washington Post, May 15, 2009:

>>Read full article here;

>>Read full article here (中文);

Ulric Killion, Modern Chinese Journey to the West (2006).

J.A.G. Roberts, A Concise History of China (1999).
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2009.

Friday, May 8, 2009

Economic crisis is driving call for more aggressive US trade policy

by M. Ulric Killion 
us-chinatradecomparison-2 Graphic/WallStats/Visualizing the US/China Trade Relationship, April 30, 2009. 

“Like it or not, the US and China have a trading relationship that has global repercussions. The plastic US flags that say Made in China don’t tell the whole story. No, not everything is made in China. In fact the US manufactures and exports almost as much as China but it consumes a great deal more. Hence, the trade imbalance;” Visualizing the US/China Trade Relationship. 

In terms of the world multilateral trade system, the onset of the global economic crisis may eventually cause a shift in US trade policy, which is a shift toward a more aggressive US trade policy (i.e., aggressive trade policies and trade barriers). An announced shift in trade policies and barriers that the Obama administration attempted to soften by the re-characterization of this policy shift, as Anthony Faiola of the Washington Times explained, as simply the move “to more strongly emphasize domestic and social issues, from the displacement of American workers to climate change.”

Despite the contagion effect of the economic crisis that has affected all countries and economies, both developed and developing countries and economics, and both western and non-western countries and economies, in the halls of Washington US policymakers appear ready to pursue a more aggressive trade regime, including aggressive trade policies and barriers.  For instance, as Faiola observed, the US “will seek new benchmarks before supporting already-written trade agreements with Colombia and South Korea and is suggesting that it will dig in its heels on global trade talks, demanding that other countries make broader concessions first.”

The shifting focus of world multilateral trade, at least from the perceptive of US policymakers, appears to emphasis the interests of constituents and special interest groups, which do not necessarily reflect the greater societal interests in the long run, and pursuit of the greater aspirations lying at the heart of world multilateral trade system (i.e., the Bretton Woods Institutions, WTO, etc.).

Faiolo wrties, “Even before the global economy went code red late last year, talks aimed at expanding global trade stalled as Western countries warred with emerging giants like China and India over how to further open markets. “

However, in terms of the larger picture, what US policymakers seemingly fail to understand is the real reality that within twenty-five years the combined GDP of China and India will exceed that of the G7 nations.  From 2030 to 2040, China will emerge as the world’s larger economy.  Moreover, by 2050, China’s current two trillion US dollar GDP is set to balloon to 48.6 trillion, while India’s GDP, now weighing in under a trillion dollars, will hit about 27 trillion. 

Nonetheless, as Faiolo writes, “Those divides appear to be more unbreachable than ever as world leaders move to protect their domestic industries from the ravages of the financial crisis, embracing new trade barriers aimed at imported goods and other measures meant to restrict the flow of capital outside their borders. In the United States, more Americans are blaming cheap imports for job losses at home and congressional leaders pressed successfully to include a "buy American" provision in the $787 billion stimulus program to give an edge to U.S.-made products.”  Our consensus to advance international trade is frayed, Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.) said at Kirk’s hearing yesterday. “Our faith in the international trading system is badly shaken.” 

Notwithstanding historical debate on whether to link world multilateral trade with social (welfare) programs, in the end, the actions of US policymakers focused on achieving short-term rather long-term goals and objectives may well be creating greater potential problems for the future that come with attendant greater social costs.

Anthony Faiola, U.S. to Toughen Its Stance On Trade, Washington Post, March 10, 2009, A01. 
M. Ulric Killion, Regional Economic Integration, Aug. 2008.
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2009.

Saturday, May 2, 2009

China proposing universal health care system

by M. Ulric Killion

For 2009, China's State Council proposed major health care reforms. One goal is an eventual reduction in the medical expenses of Chinese citizens by the year 2011. The State Council also proposed preventing hospitals from overcharging patients, preventing treating physicians from prescribing unnecessary drugs, and decoupling hospitals from affiliated-pharmacies to reduce financial incentives for hospitals to over prescribe or prescribe unnecessary drugs. The State Counsel also foresees the government providing financial assistance to those hospitals experiencing losses in income, which would be caused by the new health care reforms.

Other proposed measures are price fixing for both health care products and services (i.e., diagnosis), and a new provision that allows physicians to practice in different hospitals and even to open their own community clinics. Since the 1980s, there have been on-going health care reforms; some successful, some not so successful. For instance, in the 1980s, policy intending to expand health care services by allowing hospitals to profit from their services, actually, constricted available health care coverage. This is because previously free basic health care for all Chinese citizens became no longer available both to rural residents and those who were not employees of the government or state-owned enterprises. The new reforms intend to correct past problems by building a universal health care system that covers all citizens, including rural residents, while also reducing medical costs.

Medical reform road map: in 2020 the establishment of universal basic health insurance [医改路线图:2020年基本建立全民医保].

According to Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, April 6 - Authorized Xinhua News Agency released on the 6th, "the CPC Central Committee and State Council on Deepening the views of the medical and health system" (hereinafter referred to as "views"). "Opinions" put forward a "cost effective treatment to reduce the burden of residents to effectively alleviate the 'difficult to see a doctor, a doctor of your' choice" . The short-term objectives, as well as "establish and improve the urban and rural residents covered by basic medical and health system for the masses to provide a safe, effective, convenient and cheap medical and health services "in the long run.

"Opinions" The full text of more than 13,000 words, is divided into six parts, including: First, fully understand the medical and health system reform to deepen the importance and urgency and difficulty; Second, to deepen the medical and health system's guiding ideology, basic principles and overall objectives; three, four systems to improve medical and health, the establishment of urban and rural residents covered by basic medical and health system; four and improve the institutional mechanisms for the protection of medical and health system for effective, standardized operation; five, five key focus of reform efforts, and strive to achieve the near future notable results; six, actively and steadily push forward the medical and health system.

"Opinions" put forward to deepen the overall medical and health system objectives. By 2011, a comprehensive basic medical security system covering both urban and rural residents, the initial establishment of a basic drug system, urban and rural primary health care system to further improve health services, universal access to basic public health services, reform of public hospitals to make a breakthrough, significantly raise the basic medical and health services accessibility, cost effective medical treatment to alleviate the burden of residents to effectively alleviate the "difficult to see a doctor, a doctor of your choice".

By 2020, urban and rural residents covered by basic medical and health system and the basic set up. Establish a relatively complete system of public health services and medical service system, a relatively sound medical security system, the availability of drugs in a fairly standard security system, more scientific institutions of medical and health management system and operational mechanism, the formation of multi-run medical pattern for all basic medical and health services, the basic masses of the people to adapt to multi-level medical and health needs, the level of the people to further improve the health of the masses.

新华社6日受权发布《中共中央国务院关于 深化医药卫生体制改革的意见》(以下简称《意见》)。《意见》提出了"有效减轻居民就医费用负担,切实缓解'看病难、看病贵'"的近期目标,以及"建立健 全覆盖城乡居民的基本医疗卫生制度,为群众提供安全、有效、方便、价廉的医疗卫生服务"的长远目标。

《意见》全文13000余字,共分六个部分,包括:一、充分认识深化医药卫生体制改革的重要性、紧迫性和艰巨性;二、深化医药卫生体制改革的指 导思想、基本原则和总体目标;三、完善医药卫生四大体系,建立覆盖城乡居民的基本医疗卫生制度;四、完善体制机制,保障医药卫生体系有效、规范运转;五、 着力抓好五项重点改革,力争近期取得明显成效;六、积极稳妥推进医药卫生体制改革。

《意见》提出了深化医药卫生体制改革的总体目标。到2011年,基本医疗保障制度全面覆盖城乡居民,基本药物制度初步建立,城乡基层医疗卫生服 务体系进一步健全,基本公共卫生服务得到普及,公立医院改革试点取得突破,明显提高基本医疗卫生服务可及性,有效减轻居民就医费用负担,切实缓解"看病 难、看病贵"问题。

2020年,覆盖城乡居民的基本医疗卫生制度基本建立。普遍建立比较完善的公共卫生服务体系和医疗服务体系,比较健全的医疗保障体系,比较规 范的药品供应保障体系,比较科学的医疗卫生机构管理体制和运行机制,形成多元办医格局,人人享有基本医疗卫生服务,基本适应人民群众多层次的医疗卫生需 求,人民群众健康水平进一步提高。]. . .


Eric Mu, Universal Health Care for China?,, April 7, 2009.

State Council reveals new health care reform measures, Oriental Morning Post (Dongfang Zao Bao), April 7, 2009, [东方早报].

Announced a new medical reform program to alleviate medical difficulties, your doctor, Oriental Morning Post (Dongfang Zao Bao), April, 7, 2009, [新医改方案公布 缓解看病难、看病贵, 东方早报].

Xinhua news agency, Beijing, April 6, 2009, [新华社,北京,46].

Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2009.