Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Short history of etymology of the word liberal: of Liber and Alis!
Monday, November 8, 2010
Post-global financial crisis: The measure of the “Beijing consensus” as a variety of capitalisms
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Killion, M. Ulric (2010): Post-global financial crisis: The measure of the “Beijing consensus” as a variety of capitalisms. Unpublished.
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Abstract
In order to explore the prospective effects of what hails as the Beijing consensus, a conceptualization arguably near-synonymous with Beijing’s export-oriented strategy, the Article first discusses the state of the Chinese economy in the post-global financial crisis era. After reviewing some key indicators of the country’s economy, the Article presents a comparison between a Washington and Beijing consensus, contrasting ideological meanings between these two consensuses, and then explores the measure of the Beijing consensus as a variety of capitalisms. By doing so the Article reveals the broader role of Beijing’s export-oriented strategy and its eventual relation to international capital’s industrial transformation and the prospective effects of a Beijing consensus. The Article concludes by presenting a prospectus of the Beijing consensus as a variety of capitalisms in the post-global financial crisis era. By presenting the Beijing consensus or even export-oriented strategy as an evolving model in this new era, China’s trade and finance models prospectively present a distinctive modeling of capitalism and its tools of trade and finance models.
Item Type:
MPRA Paper
Language:
English
Keywords:
China; economy; export; capitalist; socialist; transformation
Subjects:
F - International Economics > F0 - General > F00 - General
P - Economic Systems > P0 - General > P00 - General
F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F10 - General
Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General > Z00 - General
ID Code:
26382
Deposited By:
M. Ulric Killion
Deposited On:
06. Nov 2010 12:45
Last Modified:
06. Nov 2010 12:45
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Sunday, October 24, 2010
The impact of U.S.-Arab arms deal: Balancing competing interests - ‘Speak softly and carry a big stick’
The U.S. intends to rearm its Arab allies in the Persian gulf. Photo/Deutsche Welle/Oct. 21, 2010.
U.S.-Saudi security cooperation is becoming steadily more important as Iran expands its capabilities for asymmetric warfare in the Gulf, increases its long-range missile forces, and moves toward a capability to build and deploy nuclear weapons. The same is true of the enduring threat from terrorism, dealing with Iraq’s weakness and uncertain political leadership, the problems of Yemen, and instability and piracy in the Red Sea area and Indian Ocean.
The United States needs all the friends it can find in the Gulf. It faces serious uncertainties in reshaping its security posture in the region as its forces depart from Iraq. These include Iraq’s uncertain future political stance and government, the inability to predict Iranian actions and alignments, the uncertain outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and uncertainties surrounding the success or failure of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. . . .
Meeting the Challenge of Iran
Large as these arms transfers may seem, it is important to understand that the weapons numbers involved are relatively limited, given the overall size of forces in the Gulf. Moreover, their actual cost and size will only become clear once firm contracts are signed, and major deliveries will occur over at least a five-year period. They meet key Saudi concerns in force expansion and modernization, provide the basis for full interoperability with U.S. forces in a crisis or conflict, and give Saudi Arabia a significant “edge” in air superiority against Iran. Moreover, they given the kingdom the ability to improve the overall protection of its borders and coasts, assist in countering any serious terrorist attacks, and deal with any attacks or challenges in Yemen and the Red Sea area.
From a U.S. viewpoint, these arms transfers are part of a new post–Iraq War security structure that can secure the flow of energy exports to the global economy. They reinforce the level of regional deterrence rather than threaten it; and they help reduce the size of forces the United States must deploy or be ready to project into the region. They also help ensure the U.S. strategic position in the region at time when other powers like China are becoming key players in global energy and when recycling “petrodollars” is even more important than in the past.
Hopefully, a combination of such U.S. and Saudi efforts will create an effective deterrent and not have to be used. The United States also can never take Saudi willingness to support U.S. military operations for granted, particularly after U.S. miscalculations in Iraq. The fact remains, however, that U.S.-Saudi ties are critical to both deterrence and defense, to any effective effort to check Iran’s expanding military capabilities, and to any hope that regional security structures can advance to the point where the United States can create a far more limited and “over-the-horizon” military presence and set of contingency capabilities. . . . (Source: U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales | Center for Strategic and International Studies).
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2010.
See also;
Iran plans to triple gas production by 2015
Iranian Economy Suffering from Sanctions
OFAC Issues Final Rule Prohibiting Importation into U.S. of Iranian Origin Food and Carpets
Iran scrambles to stop subsidies
Seoul’s Iran Sanctions Tread a Delicate Line
The “Persian Alliance” and Geopolitical Reconfiguration in Central Asia
U.N. watchdog says Iran boosts nuclear work
U.S. Representatives Send Letter Asking President to Enforce Iran Sanctions Act
Iran’s Reactor Fuels Hopes and Fears
Iran’s nuclear programme: Game resumed | The Economist
Iran successfully test-fires new missile
Despite Sanctions, Iran Fuels First Nuclear Reactor
Seoul Says It Plans Sanctions Talks with U.S., Iran
China, Iran pledge to cooperate more
Iran: The Geostrategic Case for Regime Change
Iran’s clerical army adjusts to sanctions
Iran, China set to expand ties in oil, gas sector
China opposes EU sanctions on Iran: Spokeswoman
India voices readiness to join Iran energy projects
Cambodia to sign oil deal with Iran
Iran, Pakistan sign gas pipeline accord
President Obama Signs Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
(U.S.) H. R. 2194 (Enrolled-Bill) - Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010
World leaders slam North Korea, Iran
N.Korea sinking raises fear of nuclear Iran
Iran dismisses sanctions, but tried to avoid them
Study advises US to increase ties
U.N. Adopts New Sanctions on Iran
Iran, nuclear weapons, and the effectiveness of economic sanctions
Thursday, October 21, 2010
Our favorite Russian spy Anna Chapman: modern Mata Hari or wannabe femme fatale
Our favorite Russian spy Anna Chapman.
Speaking of the modern Mata Hari, maybe she speaks Russian.
“Even though the Russian spy ring that included Anna Chapman failed to do much of anything other than get caught, the Kremlin has bestowed the country’s highest honor on the agents who were deported from the United States nearly three months ago” (New York: CBS).
The cover of Maxim. Russian spy Anna Chapman posed in the Russian version of Maxim magazine in the most provocative photographs yet to appear of the secret agent who was deported from the United States in July.
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Russian spy Anna Chapman posed in the Russian version of Maxim magazine in the most provocative photographs yet to appear of the secret agent who was deported from the United States in July. A photograph on www.maximonline.ru shows red-haired Chapman dressed in nylon and lace and posing with a handgun. “Anna Chapman has done more to excite Russian patriotism than the Russian soccer team,” wrote Maxim. Nine other spies were deported from the United States with her. The Kremlin has seized on the Cold War aspects of the case to try to boost the prestige of its intelligence services and avert what has widely been seen as a major disgrace for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), a successor to the KGB. . . .
(Read by Lee Hannon. Lee Hannon is a journalist at the China Daily Website.) (点击查看更多双语新闻) (Agencies).
. . . 俄罗斯美女间谍安娜•查普曼日前为男性时尚杂志《Maxim》(俄罗斯版)拍摄了一组极其性感撩人的照片。该期杂志尚未上架发售。美女间谍安娜今年7月被美国遣返回国。www.maximonline.ru 网站刊登的一张照片显示,红发披肩的查普曼身穿吊带裤袜和蕾丝内衣,还举着把手枪。《Maxim》杂志写道:“在激起俄罗斯人的爱国精神方面,安娜•查普曼的贡献比俄罗斯足球队大得多。” 与她一同被美国遣返的还有另外九名间谍。克里姆林宫方面抓住了这起事件的冷战特性,试图以此提振情报部门的声望,避免该事件被普遍看作克格勃的后继者俄罗斯对外情报局的极大耻辱. . . . (俄美女间谍登上男性杂志封面-英语点津).
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2010.
Sunday, October 17, 2010
Rousseau, Liberty, and Legality of Property
Rousseau emphasized the freewill as an elemental characteristic of humankind, while also exalting the concept of liberty. However, the invocation of freewill and liberty required a social contract, which is the true social contract, thereby providing legitimacy for a governing political organization. The true contract allows individuals to accomplish what they could not do by acting in the singular rather than in cooperation with others. For the true contract they must organize, but do so in disregard of their self-interest and freedom. This is the price that must be paid when transitioning to the social state, because, and borrowing from the words of Denis Diderot, or his play, which is his Le Fils naturel (The natural son, 1757), “Only the bad man lives alone.”
Copyright © Protected - All Rights Reserved M. Ulric Killion, 2009.
Sunday, September 26, 2010
Mohamed v. Jeppensen Dataplan: Issues of Presidential Power and State Secrets
Mohamed v. Jeppensen Dataplan
The Supreme Court has long recognized that in exceptional circumstances courts must act in the interest of the country’s national security to prevent disclosure of state secrets, even to the point of dismissing a case entirely. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876). The contemporary state secrets doctrine encompasses two applications of this principle. One completely bars adjudication of claims premised on state secrets (the “Totten bar”); the other is an evidentiary privilege (“the Reynolds privilege”) that excludes privileged evidence from the case and may result in dismissal of the claims.3 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (Mohamed, at 13529).
We, like the dissent, emphasize that it should be a rare case when the state secrets doctrine leads to dismissal at the outset of a case. Nonetheless, there are such cases — not just those subject to Totten’s per se rule, but those where the mandate for dismissal is apparent even under the more searching examination required by Reynolds. This is one of those rare cases.
For all the reasons the dissent articulates — including the impact on human rights, the importance of constitutional protections and the constraints of a judge-made doctrine — we do not reach our decision lightly or without close and skeptical scrutiny of the record and the government’s case for secrecy and dismissal. We expect our decision today to inform district courts that Totten has its limits, that every effort should be made to parse claims to salvage a case like this using the Reynolds approach, that the standards for peremptory dismissal are very high and it is the district court’s role to use its fact-finding and other tools to full advantage before it concludes that the rare step of dismissal is justified. We also acknowledge that this case presents a painful conflict between human rights and national security. As judges, we have tried our best to evaluate the competing claims of plaintiffs and the government and resolve that conflict according to the principles governing the state secrets doctrine set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
[18] For the reasons stated, we hold that the government’s valid assertion of the state secrets privilege warrants dismissal of the litigation, and affirm the judgment of the district court.16 The government shall bear all parties’ costs on appeal.
During the long years that the Justice Department was investigating Jay S. Bybee and John C. Yoo, it was tempting to view the torture memos as if they were momentary aberrations in the life of the modern presidency. But in clearing the Bush administration lawyers who authored the memos of all charges of unprofessional conduct, the department invites future John Yoos to rubber-stamp future presidential abuses at moments of (real or imagined) crisis. The torture memos are an entirely predictable product of an institutional set-up that puts the meaning of national security law at the mercy of a politicized Office of Legal Counsel and a super-politicized legal staff in the White House. There is a compelling need to reform that structure.
Recently, Barack Obama has found his own convenient rationales for endorsing broad presidential powers in the area of surveillance. When he signed on to the surveillance bill Congress passed this summer, Sen. Obama broke an explicit campaign promise to filibuster any legislation that would grant immunity to FISA-flouting telecom companies. By voting for the bill, Obama helped legalize large swaths of a dragnet surveillance program he’d long claimed to oppose. Perhaps some were comforted by Obama’s “firm pledge that as president, I will carefully monitor the program.” But our constitutional structure envisions stronger checks than the supposed benevolence of our leaders.
It’s clear that Obama is intent on changing America’s course in a dramatic way, as Ronald Reagan did in 1981. But Obama, while he admires Reagan’s “transformational” approach, seeks to reverse much of what Reagan accomplished. “This is a guy who is defining a new way forward,” says Will Marshall, president of the centrist Progressive Policy Institute. “This is terra incognita. People aren’t used to seeing changes in government that are this dramatic.”
In a way, Obama is doing what George W. Bush did in the national security sphere, using a crisis to expand presidential authority. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Bush moved to increase and exert his war-making powers. Now, amid the recession and financial meltdown, Obama is moving to increase and exert his peacetime powers. The result in both cases has been a more muscular presidency.


